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Summary
The Indigenous Land Corporation (ILC) is a relatively new Commonwealth
statutory authority. Although it commenced operations on 5 June 1995, it has
only recently started its functional operations of land acquisition and
management. However, it is new not only in the sense of its short operational
existence, but also in the unique policy mechanisms enshrined in its enabling
legislation that aim to provide better outcomes in indigenous land acquisition and
land management.
This Discussion Paper explores those unique policy mechanisms and
contrasts them with past Commonwealth policies and practices of indigenous
land acquisition and management. It is argued that notwithstanding these
mechanisms, the potential for success for the ILClies in its ability to substantially
address long-standing issues in indigenous land acquisition and land
management. Since the early 1970s a number of Commonwealth agencies have
been charged with policy and program responsibility for indigenous land
acquisition and each institution has displayed a comparatively different approach.
We suggest that the role of land acquisition as a measure designed to promote
policies of self-determination and self-management for indigenous Australians
has rarely been clearly defined. There has been continual shifting between
cultural, social and economic objectives; some approaches have focused purely on
rural and remote acquisitions, while others have allowed urban land purchase.
The paper demonstrates the combined outcome of market acquisition
programs and land rights legislation, noting that it is the latter which has been
most successful in addressing indigenous aspirations to land. More than 15 per
cent of the Australian continent is currently under the control of indigenous
interests. Notably, most of this land is located in the rangelands and a large
proportion is marginal, overgrazed and degraded, and requires significant
financial commitment to restore. The extent and type of land that makes up the
indigenous estate raises significant policy implications for the ILC as one of its
major functions is to assist indigenous people to manage their land regardless of
whether that land was acquired by the ILCor another agency or granted through
land rights or other laws.
The ILC pursues a policy of acquisition of land purely on the basis of
cultural attachment as a means to address indigenous dispossession - an
approach which is derived from the Corporation's primary purpose prescribed in
the legislation. While the ILC's policy is based on the sound objective of restoring
a land base to traditional ownership, arguably, in strictly enforcing its cultural
criteria, commercially viable land which may facilitate important long-term
economic development for indigenous groups can be neglected. Marginal land, on
the other hand, because of its cultural significance and ready availability might
more easily be purchased. The challenge for the ILC is how to balance cultural
and commercial aspirations.
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A key feature of the legislation is the ILC's power to establish subsidiaries.
This option could add a powerful potential for new policy approaches. In
particular, the tensions between cultural and economic developmentobjectives
can be addressed in ways that have not been possible before. For example, a land
management subsidiary could sub-lease land from traditional owners for
commercial operations. There is a view that commercial success requires large
tracts of land to generate essential economies of scale: sub-leasing on a large
regional basis could provide indigenous interests with such opportunities.
Although we note that it is too early to definitely assess the performance of
the ILC a number of key developments can be observed:
• the ILC is making considerable progress towards quantifying indigenous
land holdings throughout Australia. The completion of this task will be
important as it will provide an essential and rigorous base for further policy
refinement and development;
• three subsidiaries have been established and are in the early stages of
development;
• an overarching subsidiary, Land Enterprise Australia, has been established
which has a strict commercial focus and will provide the basis to enhance
the ILC's prospects of achieving better economic outcomes on indigenous-
owned land, particularly in its role as a mentoring agency; and
• investment performance of the Land Fund, from which the ILC is funded,
indicates that the goal of financial self-sufficiency will be achieved, thus
providing financial resources independent of the budget well into the next
century.
The ILC's strategic and proactive, yet cautious, approach augurs well for
improved outcomes in indigenous land acquisition and management that should
exceed earlier efforts by others over the past 25 years. The paper concludes by
noting that the policy mechanisms enshrined in the legislation and implemented
by the ILCare indeed a fundamentally new approach because:
• the statutorily guaranteed income stream for a Commonwealth statutory
authority is unprecedented in indigenous land acquisition and
management;
• the powers to establish subsidiaries is a significant break with the past; and
• the ILC has considerable autonomy and flexibility in dividing income
between administration, land purchase, land management and investment.
C E N T R E F O R A B O R I G I N A L E C O N O M I C P O L I C Y R E S E A R C H
DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 169 VII
Acknowledgments
The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of
Murray Chapman, Sally Skyring and other ILC staff
for providing a considerable amount of background
information during all stages of research and for their
hospitality during David Pollack's visit to Adelaide in
August 1998. We are also grateful to a number of staff
from the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commission (ATSIC) who provided statistical
information. In particular, Steven Vince from the
Finance Branch of ATSIC for financial information on
the Land Fund. Thanks also to Mike Dillon, Will
Sanders and Bill Arthur for their comments and
critical appraisal of an earlier draft of this paper, and
Tony Auld for his assistance with the compilation and
analysis of the statistical data. Editorial assistance
was provided by Linda Roach and Hilary Bek, and
layout was by Jennifer Braid.
C E N T R E F O R A B O R I G I N A L E C O N O M I C P O L I C Y R E S E A R C H

DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 169
Introduction
The Indigenous Land Corporation (ILC) is an independent statutory authority,
with functional responsibility to assist indigenous people to acquire and manage
land. The creation of the ILC and the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Land Fund (theLand Fund), formed the second part of the former
Keating Government's proposed three-part response to the High Court's 1992
Mabo decision which recognised native title as a unique form of indigenous
property right at common law. Essentially, the purpose of the Land Fund is to
provide a funding mechanism for the acquisition of land for those indigenous
people who could not benefit from the recognition of native title.
The ILC is funded from the Land Fund, which will receive $1.29 billion in
government appropriations over the ten-year period 1995to 2004.l Under its
statutory framework the Fund is to become self-sustaining by 30 June 2004(ILC
1997: 74). Accordingly, about two-thirds of the annual appropriations to the Land
Fund are directed to investment, while the ILC's drawdown from the Fund for
land acquisition and management operations is limited to about one-third. The
high proportion committed to investment is to ensure that the Land Fund will be
self-sustaining with an estimated capital base of $1.1 billion at the end of the
government's ten-year financial commitment, thus ensuring continuation of the
Fund without further government support.
This discussion paper examines the rationale for the establishment of the
ILC and the Land Fund and explores the unique policy mechanisms which are
intended to provide better outcomes in indigenous land acquisition and land
management. The paper begins by briefly outlining the history of Commonwealth
institutional involvement in purchasing land for indigenous Australians, and
reviewing the different policies and practices of those institutions. In order to
demonstrate the legacy of past land acquisition and management policies, and the
possible extent of the ILC's land management responsibilities, indigenous land-
holdings in Australia are estimated. It is argued that while it may be premature to
assess the performance of the ILC to date, its ultimate success or failure will rely
on strategies to address long-standing issues relevant to past and present
government institutions. The paper then explores current ILC strategies and
operations, noting that the statutory framework in which it operates provides an
unprecedented approach to indigenous land acquisition and management and
offers optimism for improved future outcomes.
Background
Commonwealth functional responsibility for acquiring land for indigenous
interests can be traced from the mid 1960s and early 1970s when a number of
social, political, legal and international developments converged causing the
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Commonwealth to address the questions of indigenous rights and access to land.
As Palmer (1988: 9) notes, prior to the 1967 referendum, which empowered the
Commonwealth to make special laws for indigenous Australians, the purchase or
allocation of land reserved for Aboriginal use was a State matter, except for the
Commonwealth's responsibility in the Northern Territory.
In the year following the referendum, the new Office of Aboriginal Affairs
(OAA) persuaded then Prime Minister, Gorton, to set up the Capital Fund for
Aboriginal Enterprises. The purpose of the fund was to lend money to purchase
commercially-viable properties for indigenous people. However, many pastoral
leases which indigenous people wished to buy did not meet the 'commercial' test
employed by the Capital Fund, and the OAA agitated for a more flexible approach
(Rowse 1992:15). A more substantial commitment was made in January1972
when then Prime Minister, McMahon, announced a program of acquiring
properties for indigenous communities, for which an initial $5 million plus $2
million per annum for the next four years was to be provided.2 Under the scheme
properties were acquired under the Lands Acquisition Act, and this involved
problems in both acquisition and in subsequent allocation of the title (Department
of Aboriginal Affairs (DAA) 1974: 12).
Later in 1972, the Whitlam Government came to power with a far-reaching
reform agenda and a platform to enact legislation for Aboriginal land rights. A
fully fledged federal Aboriginal Affairs department was established, combining the
small OAA with the Commonwealth's larger Aboriginal Welfare Branch of the
Northern Territory Administration (Altman and Sanders 1991: 5). The Whitlam
Government undertook to provide up to $5 million per annum over a ten-year
period for land purchases for indigenous interests throughout Australia. It was
also decided that purchases might be by way of grants to the intended indigenous
communities to enable them to purchase titles themselves (DAA 1974: 12). One of
the more significant Whitlam initiatives was the establishment of the Woodward
Royal Commission to inquire and report as to the means by which, not whether,
Aboriginal land rights could be recognised in the Northern Territory. Woodward
not only recommended a framework for the recognition and claiming of land
rights over vacant Crown land in the Northern Territory, he also recommended
the creation of a body to acquire land for indigenous people in all States and
Territories.
Woodward's recommendations resulted in the creation of the Aboriginal
Land Fund Commission (ALFC). The ALFC operated from May 1975 to June 1980
(Palmer 1988: 6) and assumed the role of land acquisition from DAA. As an
independent statutory authority the ALFC was controlled by five appointed
commissioners, three of whom were indigenous, and the day-to-day
administration was carried out by a secretariat of about seven public servants
(Palmer 1988:42). ALFC acquisitions were premised on the recognition that land
remained primarily of social and cultural value to Aboriginal communities. In its
five years of operations the ALFC purchased 59 properties for Aboriginal
communities, at a total cost of $6 million (ALFC 1980: 1). These properties were
predominantly pastoral properties in rural and outback Australia as the general
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directives under the Act precluded the purchase of land in metropolitan areas
(Bourke 1983: 254).
Notably, the ALFC's role was that of a purchasing agency only, and was not,
at least theoretically, responsible for post-purchase management assistance and
advice (Rowley 1986: 257). As most acquisitions were cheap and in poor
condition, being located on the margins of the pastoral zone, the land was seldom
viable and unlikely to provide an economic base for Aboriginal communities with
or without heavy injections of capital (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commission (ATSIC) 1992: 1). Following purchase, the ALFC carried no further
responsibility for the cattle station communities or their businesses, leaving that
to DAA or State/Territory departments. This resulted in considerable tensions
between the ALFC and the DAA or State governments, as the ALFC inevitably and
indirectly committed other agencies to funding post-purchase management and
development.3
In 1980 the Aboriginal Development Commission (ADC) replaced the ALFC
as the agency charged with the responsibility for indigenous land acquisition. The
Fraser Government established the ADC to focus on economic development for
indigenous communities (Turner 1997: 6). Indigenous enterprise development and
housing programs were integrated into the new Commission. High expectations
were held of the ADC concerning the potential for economic viability for the
smaller and medium-sized properties acquired in eastern Australia for the
culturally fragmented Aboriginal communities then living in towns and isolated
mission settlements (ATSIC 1992: 2). Furthermore, high expectations were held in
respect to post-purchase development given the integrated nature of the ADC
program structure.
However, the ADC moved cautiously in acquiring land for a number of
reasons. First, there was the problem of land improvement investment. For
example, some indigenous land owners told the McLeay Committee, which
investigated the ADC's operations in 1984, that the ADChad been unable to meet
their needs for investment capital after purchase (Rowse 1992: 15).Second, the
ADC Commissioners seem to have questioned the value of land purchases
explaining that fewer properties of traditional significance were coming onto the
market, and asking prices were increasing. The Commission hoped that as the
States and Territories began to legislate for land rights the demand on ADC's
funds to purchase properties would lessen (ADC 1987:67). Third, it appears that
the ADC had been more constrained than the ALFC by having to prioritise funds
for housing, enterprises and land from the same appropriation (Rowse 1992: 15).
Palmer (1988: 158) demonstrates that only a range of 2 to 6 per cent of total ADC
expenditure per year was allocated for land purchases between the 1980-81 and
1984-85 financial years.
ATSIC was established on 5 March 1990 and assumed most functions of the
DAA and ADC including land acquisition and management. ATSIC's Land
Acquisition and Management Program deemed that funds were to be directed to
communities where, in comparison with other areas, there were significant unmet
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needs (ATSIC 1994a: 19). Land could be purchased for economic, social, cultural
or traditional purposes. Like the ADC, ATSIC was constrained by the need to fund
land acquisitions from a single appropriation meant for a plethora of program
objectives. Nevertheless, it is evident that ATSIC facilitated the acquisition of more
properties than any of its predecessors. In the two financial years 1992-93 to
1993-94 ATSIC assisted with the acquisition of 119 properties expending over $38
million (ATSIC 1993: 38; ATSIC 1994b: 42).
Apart from the Land Acquisition and Management Program, other
mechanisms within the ATSIC structure provided for the acquisition of land. The
Aboriginals Benefit Reserve4 (ABR), established by the Aboriginal Land Rights
(Northern Territory) Act 1976 (ALRA), which operates like a small secretariat within
ATSIC's Northern Territory State Office, was also active in the purchasing of land
specifically for the benefit of Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory.
The ABR has acquired eight pastoral properties at a total cost in excess of $19
million. Another mechanism is the Regional Land Fund (RLF), created by s.68 of
the ATSIC legislation, which allows ATSIC regional councils to allocate moneys
from their annual discretionary budgets to the RLF for future land purchases.
Funds in the RLF are invested and when accumulations are adequate regional
councils may withdraw the accumulated amount to acquire land. The utilisation
of the RLF was relatively slow in its early years of operation, however some 22
properties have now been acquired through the RLF.5
With the establishment of the ILC. ATSIC's Land Acquisition and
Management operations were wound down. During a two-year transitional phase
(1995-97) both ATSIC and the ILC received drawdowns from the Land Fund to
acquire land. However, ATSIC's program responsibility effectively ceased on 30
June 1997, and specific and prime responsibility for indigenous land acquisition
and management was shifted to the ILC. Nevertheless, ATSIC's interest in land
acquisition and management continues, not only as a partner in post-purchase
funding and development, but potentially as a facilitator of acquisitions through
the RLF, and the ABRin the Northern Territory.
Indigenous land ownership
ATSIC estimates that there were 330 parcels of land acquired for indigenous
interests through specific land acquisition programs by Commonwealth
institutions between 1972 and 1997 (excluding ILC acquisitions). Apart from
specific land acquisition programs, the ADC and ATSIC have acquired a
significant number of parcels of land with the use of other programs funds for the
purpose of acquiring land for housing. The area of land acquired specifically for
housing or through other programs has never been quantified. Other
Commonwealth agencies have acquired land for indigenous interests, either
outright or as contributors. For example, the Department of Prime Minister and
Cabinet contributed $1.7 million to purchase Bauhinia Downs in the Northern
Territory, as part of the McArthur River Mine negotiations (Farley 1994: 173), and
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in 1994 the then Commonwealth Department of the Environment contributed to
the acquisition of Starke Station in North Queensland. It is also most likely that
other State and Territory programs have also contributed to the acquisition of
land for indigenous interests from a variety of programs.
The plethora of institutions, programs and legislation that have facilitated
the transfer of land to indigenous interests makes it extremely difficult to quantify
the amount of land under Aboriginal ownership in Australia today. There exists
no comprehensive information source which identifies all current indigenous land
holdings, although both the ILC and the National Native Title Tribunal (NNTT) are
collecting data for their respective operations. Previous attempts to establish a
consolidated database have been fraught with problems such as reconciling
Aboriginal place names with those listed on the public record and other
inadequacies in quality control such as the actual dates of acquisition (ATSIC
1992: 9).6 The team that evaluated ATSIC's land acquisition program in 1992
commented that DAA and ATSIC need to share some responsibility for the
absence of an accessible and complete database (ATSIC 1992: 9).
However, what is evident from the available statistics is that past
Commonwealth land acquisition programs have contributed only marginally to
indigenous aspirations for land. Although market acquisition programs predate
major land rights legislation, it is the latter which has facilitated the transfer of
the major proportion of land to indigenous people. Significantly, grants of land
through the processes of the ALRA. account for half of the indigenous land estate
Australia-wide (see Table 2). This is as a result not only of the application of the
ALRA, but also of the availability of significant amounts of vacant crown land in
the Northern Territory that could be claimed. In South Australia, State land rights
legislation has also facilitated the transfer of extensive tracts of land in the north-
west.
Table 1. Parcels and area of indigenous land by State/Territory
State/Territory Parcels of
indigenous land
NSW (incl. ACT)
Qld
WA
NT
Vic
SA
Tas
Total
1,195
121
259
200
13
39
15
1,842
Area of
indigenous land
(000 km2)
1.6
42.0
326.0
584.0
14.0
190.0
4.8
1,162.4
Area of
State/Territory
(000km2)
804
1,727
2,526
1,348
228
984
68
7685
Indigenous land
as proportion of
State/Territory
(percent)
0.2
2.5
13.0
43.4
6.1
19.3
7.0
15.1
Note: The Australian Capital Territory is included in the ILC Region of New South Wales.
Source: ILC Regional Indigenous Land Strategies.7
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Table 1 estimates the number of parcels of indigenous land, the total area of
indigenous land in each State and Territory, as well as identifying the proportion
of each State and Territory under indigenous ownership. As this table
demonstrates, the majority of parcels of land held by indigenous interests, simply
on a numerical basis, are located in New South Wales (approximately70 per cent
of all parcels) while compared to other States and Territories there is only a small
area of land under indigenous control in New South Wales. This might suggest,
based purely on the number of parcels of land, there may be more indigenous
land owners in New South Wales than in any other part of Australia. Indeed,
there exists no empirical study to prove otherwise. What is apparent is that,
generally, indigenous land holdings in southern Australia are small, reflecting
different land use and land tenure systems compared to areas of northern
Australia where there are extensive tracts of pastoral and grazing tenements.
Table 2 estimates the distribution of indigenous land in each State and
Territory, the per capita land holdings by population and square kilometres and
the proportion of the indigenous estate in each State and Territory. As can be
readily observed less than 1 per cent of the total area of indigenous land holdings
can be found in Victoria, New South Wales and Tasmania where approximately 38
per cent of indigenous people reside. This partially reflects the great unevenness
between States/Territories, firstly as to whether they have land rights at all, and
secondly, in those that do, in the provisions that have been made and the amount
of land that can reasonably be made available through a claim process. In some
States and Territories land rights laws apply to the entire State (for example, New
South Wales and the Northern Territory), while in others the statute relates only
to specific areas within the State or Territory (for example, South Australia,
Tasmania and Victoria).
Table 2. Indigenous land in Australia and its distribution
State/Territory Indigenous land
(000 km2)
NSW (incl. ACT)
Qld
WA
NT
Vic
SA
Tas
1.6
42.0
326.0
584.0
14.0
190.0
4.8
Indigenous
population
(1996) Census)
104.4
95.5
50.8
46.3
21.5
20.5
13.9
Land per capita
(sq km2)
0.02
0.44
6.42
12.62
0.65
9.29
0.35
Proportion of
Australian
share of
indigenous
land
< 1.0
3.6
28.0
50.2
1.2
16.4
< 1.0
Source: ILC Regional Land Strategies; Australian Bureau of Statistics 1996 Census.
Although land rights legislation has not been enacted in Western Australia,
the proportion of the area of land under indigenous ownership is comparatively
higher than in many other States. As demonstrated in the tables, both in terms of
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per capita indigenous ownership (6.4 square kilometres per person) and of the
proportion of the area of the State under Aboriginal ownership (13 per cent), the
ownership of land by indigenous interests rates third behind the Northern
Territory and South Australia. While there are significant areas of reserve lands in
Western Australia, these considerable land holdings are attributed in part to the
impact of market acquisition in Western Australia.
It should be noted that there are extreme regional variations within States
and Territories also. Most indigenous-held land in South Australia is located in
the north-west of the State. Most indigenous land in Western Australia is located
in the Kimberley and Western Desert while there is very little indigenous-held
land in the south-west (ILC 1998a: 67).
The statutory framework
The National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land Fund was created by
Section 201 of the Native Title Act 1993 (NTA). However, the NTAdid not specify
the administrative arrangements for the fund. Through a process of negotiations
between government, ATSIC and other stakeholders, it was finally agreed that a
new organisation be established with land acquisition and management functions
which was adequately resourced to address the question of indigenous
dispossession. It was decided that an autonomous body was needed with the
ability to focus specifically on the long-term management of the indigenous estate
and to act commercially in the market place.
A Bill to establish the ILC and to specify the operations of the Land Fund
was initially introduced into Parliament in June 1994. This Bill was significantly
amended in the Senate and referred to a Senate Select Committee. On 28
February 1995 a new Bill was introduced. The Land Fund and Indigenous Land
Corporation (ATSIC Amendment) Act was passed by the Senate on 21 March 1995
and assented to on 29 March 1995. The Act effectively repealed Part 10 of the NTA
and amended the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Act 1989 by inserting a new
Part 4A. The legislation came into effect on 1 June 1995 (ILC 1996a: 60).
The Preamble to the legislation which established the ILC states that the
purpose of the fund is to address the widespread dispossession of indigenous
peoples who, because of their dispossession and forced removal from their
traditional land, would be unable to assert native title or regain any of their land
through native title processes. The purpose and primary functions of the ILC are
specified in the legislation as follows:
S.191B—Purposes of the Indigenous Land Corporation:
(a) to assist Aboriginal persons and Torres Strait Islanders to acquire land, and
(b) to assist Aboriginal persons and Torres Strait Islanders to manage indigenous-
held land; so as to provide economic, environmental, social or cultural benefits.
S.191D—The land acquisition functions of the Indigenous Land Corporation:
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(a) to grant interests in land to Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islanders corporations;
(b) to acquire by agreement interests in land for the purposes of making grants
under paragraph (a);
(c) to make grants of money to Aboriginal or Torres Strait corporations for the
acquisition of interests in land;
(d) to guarantee loans made to Aboriginal or Torres Strait corporations for the
purposes of acquisition of interests in land.
S.191E—The land management functions of the Indigenous Land Corporation:
(a) to carry on, or arrange for the carrying on of, land management activities in
relation to indigenous-held land under agreements with the holders of the land;
(b) to carry on, or arrange for the carrying on of, land management activities in
relation to land held by the Indigenous Land Corporation;
(c) to carry on other land management activities in relation to indigenous-held
land;
(d) to make grants of money for the carrying on of land management activities in
relation to indigenous-held land;
(e) to make loans of money (whether secured or unsecured) for the purpose of
carrying on land management activities in relation to indigenous-held land;
(0 to guarantee loans made for the purpose of carrying on land management
activities in relation to indigenous-held land.
The ILC is overseen by a board of directors appointed by the Minister for
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs who, in making these appointments,
must consult with the Minister for Finance and ATSIC. The primary responsibility
of the Board is to ensure the proper and efficient performance of the functions of
the ILC and to determine the policy of the Corporation with respect to any matter
(s. 191W). The board consists of seven members of which five, including the
Chairperson, are Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander people. One of the five
members must be an ATSIC Commissioner. The Minister must also ensure that at
least two appointed ordinary members of the board have experience in business
or financial management. Apart from the Chairperson, appointments are on a
part-time basis.
Stringent planning requirements are a feature of the ILC's statutory
framework. The legislation requires the ILC to prepare and periodically review a
National Indigenous Land Strategy (NILS) (S.191N). The NILS is a disallowable
instrument which must be tabled in the Parliament. The purpose of the NILS is
to inform indigenous people and the Australian public of the strategies, policies
and priorities which will guide ILC land acquisition and land management
functions. The ILC is also required to prepare Regional Indigenous Land
Strategies (R1LS) (s. 191P) which outline the ILC's priorities for acquisition and
management of land in each State and Territory.8 There is no requirement for the
tabling of the RILS although there are obligations placed on the ILC by the
legislation to consult with ATSIC regional councils in the formulation of strategies.
The ILC has more similarities with the ALFC than any of its predecessors.
Just as the ALFC was created in order to acquire land for those indigenous people
who were not to benefit from the enactment of land rights legislation, similarly the
ILC was created to provide a land acquisition mechanism for groups who were
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unable to benefit from the future recognition of native title. Both organisations
had comparatively restricted program objectives compared with the ADC and
ATSIC. Nevertheless, while both organisations were separate statutory authorities
with Boards of Directors comprising of indigenous and specialist non-indigenous
representatives, there are obvious distinctions. Most notable is the ILC's role in
post-purchase management, the ILC's ability to acquire land in urban areas, the
innovative onus on planning embedded in the ILC legislation and its potentially
formidable commercial powers to create subsidiaries. More significant is the
guaranteed income stream to the ILC which is unprecedented in indigenous land
acquisition and management, and which permits the ILC to pursue long-term
planning strategies.
The scope of the ILC's land acquisition interest
The first NILS became effective on 1 May 1996 and is essentially the Corporation's
strategic operational plan for the period 1996-2001. During that period the ILC
will receive $253 million from the Land Fund. Although the ILC has legislative
responsibilities for assisting indigenous people to acquire and manage land in
ways which provide social, cultural, environmental and economic benefits, the
first NILS gives priority to the acquisition of land which is of cultural significance
to indigenous people. The NILS applies the following criteria in order to determine
cultural attachment:
traditional attachment—significance of land based on customs and traditions
which pre-date colonial occupation (for example, traditional homelands,
sacred sites, fishing places);
historical attachment—significance of land based on events which have
occurred since colonial occupation of the region, and may have resulted in
disruption of pre-contact customs and traditions (for example, massacre sites,
burial sites, former missions, workplaces etc.);
contemporary attachment—significance of land based on the more recent
assertion and recognition of indigenous rights (both land rights and cultural
heritage), and aimed at re-establishing indigenous identity or recognition in an
area (for example, special land and/or buildings in rural or urban centres)
(ILC 1996b: 13).
The onus on land purely based on cultural attachment means that land
with significant commercial potential, or the acquisition of successful businesses
which own land, cannot be acquired. The ILCcontends that although it has some
responsibility to address issues of indigenous economic development it is not a
major player in the economic development arena. It does, however, see itself as a
partner in the move toward greater economic wellbeing for indigenous peoples
(ILC 1998b: 2). Moreover, the ILC takes the view that the acquisition of
businesses which own land, or development of indigenous commercial
enterprises, falls more appropriately within the ambit of ATSIC or the Commercial
Development Corporation.
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However, in the post-purchase phase and in order to facilitate the
operations of properties with commercial viability, the ILC has powers to form
subsidiaries. Subsidiaries can be formed as either an association or a proprietary
limited company. The ILC currently operates three rural-based subsidiaries:
Mogila Merino Stud Pty Ltd (north-west New South Wales), Mount Clarence
Pastoral Station Pty Ltd (near Cooper Pedy in South Australia), and Cardabia
Pastoral Company Pty Ltd (mid-coast Western Australia). The first subsidiary,
Mogila, incorporated in May 1997, recorded a modest profit during the 1997-98
financial year (ILC 1998a: 40). Mount Clarence, however, is currently operating at
a loss due to the need for funds injection and lower than expected wool yields in
its first year of operations (ILC 1998a: 41). The ILC reports Cardabia, which was
incorporated in November 1997, as performing satisfactorily.
In performing its land acquisition functions, the ILCis required by statute
to search any relevant registers of the NNTT to ascertain whether any claims have
been lodged, accepted or determined in relation to land under consideration for
acquisition. This does not necessarily preclude the ILCfrom acquiring land under
native title claim. However, given the ILC's resources, and the possibility that
such land might come under indigenous control, land under claim would appear
to be of less priority. Notably, s.47 of the NTA provides that claims can be lodged
over pastoral leases held by native title claimants and that prior extinguishment,
in such circumstances, is to be disregarded.9 Therefore, prospectively, the ILC
may be called upon to play a strategic role in the acquisition of pastoral leases in
order to preserve native title rights.
Table 3. Private held (freehold) land and leasehold land in Australia,
1993: a summary
State/Territory
NT
SA
Qld
ACT
NSW
Vic
WA
Tas
Total
Private
(000 km2)
6.4
158.3
625.2
Nil
405.6
155.3
204.9
27.2
1582.9
Percentage of
State/Territory
5
16.1
36.1
0
50.5
68.3
8.1
39.8
20.5
Leasehold
(000 km2)
668.2
418.5
939.3
0.9
308.9
0.1
900.1
0
3236.0
Percentage of
State/Territory
49.6
42.6
54.3
0
38.5
0
35.6
0
42.1
Source: AUSLIG 1993.
Notwithstanding the strategic options available to the ILCto acquire land to
preserve native title rights, or to participate within the framework of an
Indigenous Land Use Agreement (see Smith 1998), the ultimate focus of ILC
acquisitions will be private or freehold land, which is clearly unavailable for native
title claim, and leasehold land, most of which is also unavailable for claim. As
Table 3 indicates, privately held land accounts for 20.5 per cent of land in
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Australia and leasehold for 42 per cent. A higher proportion of private land is
located in the southern States while the major portion of leasehold, which is
primarily pastoral land, is located in Queensland, Western Australia, the
Northern Territory and South Australia.
It should be noted that the ILC is restricted from acquiring some forms of
leasehold land. Queensland's Land Act 1994 , for example, prevents corporations
from purchasing and owning Grazing Homestead Freeholding Leases or Grazing
Homestead Perpetual Leases. These leases represent 5,805 properties covering a
total area of 37,100 sq. kms (ILC 1998b: 17). It appears that the intent of the
legislation is to prevent substantial areas of Queensland from coming under the
concentrated control of a few corporations. The Government's rationale is that the
economic development of these areas would be better accomplished through
individual and family ownership of the leases rather than corporate ownership.
This legislation subsequently prevents the ILC from performing its primary
function in a substantial part of Queensland (ILC 1998b: 17).
Operations
The ILCcommenced operations on 1 June 1995 and the first Board meeting was
held on 5-6 June 1995 (ILC 1996a: 60). The primary focus of operations for the
first two years was the establishment of the administrative structure, and the
completion of the NILS and RILS and other related policy documents. Land
purchases were essentially restricted until the tabling of the NILS in Parliament in
May 1996, although several acquisitions were approved by the Board during the
1995-96 financial year.
The ILC established its head office in Adelaide and divisional offices were
located in Brisbane, Perth and Adelaide. The organisation currently has a staff
base of 35 permanent officers who, apart from the General Manager, are employed
under s. 129S of the ATSIC Act with broadly similar conditions to those of the
Australian Public Service. The head office develops and coordinates financial,
administrative, and legal policy and provides research, information technology
and public information services on a national basis. The Eastern Divisional Office
(Brisbane) has regional jurisdiction for Queensland, Torres Strait and New South
Wales, the Western Divisional Office (Perth) for Western Australia only and the
Central Divisional Office (Adelaide) for South Australia, Victoria, Tasmania and
the Northern Territory. Operational activities in divisional offices include the
assessment of acquisitions and land management registrations, the collation of
statistical data for a variety of management tools and the facilitation of planning
to prospective and current indigenous landowners.
The ILC has adopted a substantially different approach to that of its
predecessors in its approach to land acquisition and divestment. Although theILC
is permitted to make grants to incorporated indigenous bodies to acquire land,
the approach adopted is that the ILCacquires the land and later divests it. This
permits the ILC to act strategically in the market place free from the time
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restrictions of bureaucratic application processes, allows it to undertake
improvements before divestment, and also permits the ILC to undertake the
necessary consultations with prospective land owners in order to establish the
most appropriate land holding entity.
Instead of operating with an application-based system, the ILC has
developed a Register of Land Needs. Indigenous organisations and
unincorporated groups are able to register land acquisition proposals based on
land needs. At the same time, regional indigenous entities such as ATSIC regional
councils and Native Title Representative Bodies (NTRBs) are requested to submit
regional overviews to the ILC. These documents, together with the NILS and RILS,
assist the ILC to determine the priority of acquisitions from the registrations in
the Land Needs database as properties become available on the market. The
database currently has in excess of 400 entries which account for an area of 13
million hectares across the country.
The main tenet of the ILC's policy is to divest title to land it has purchased
to an indigenous corporation which represents the traditional owners of the land
(ILC 1998a: 46). This means that in the majority of cases the group or corporation
which first sought the purchase of the land is not ultimately the land holding
body. The ILC's rationale for its divestment policy is to prevent the ILC itself from
becoming an agent for dispossession by purchasing land for one group in the
traditional area of another. The ILC acknowledges the difficulties inimplementing
the policy in all parts of Australia. Indeed, the recent decision by the ILCBoard to
divest its Tasmanian land holdings to the Aboriginal Land Council of Tasmania
demonstrates that there is a degree of flexibility within the policy and that
practical solutions can be found providing such proposals are supported within
the local Aboriginal community.
ILC land acquisitions
Since the commencement of its land acquisition function, to 31 July 1998, the
ILC has facilitated the settlement of 50 properties. Table 4 lists the number and
area of acquisitions in each State and Territory. A further 49 properties have been
approved by the Board, most of which will be settled during the 1998-99 financial
year.
The ILC estimates that in area its land acquisitions to date account for
0.0072 per cent of the area of land in Australia. While most acquisitions have
been in Queensland (14) and New South Wales (11), larger areas of land have
been purchased in South Australia and Western Australia. Although only two
parcels of land were bought in the Northern Territory the total area of land
acquired is almost double that in New South Wales. It appears that the trend in
land acquisitions by the ILC reflects that of other Commonwealth institutions in
that a higher number of parcels of land are being purchased in New South Wales,
where land costs are comparatively higher, while cheaper and larger areas of land
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are being acquired in the range lands of Western Australia, South Australia and
the Northern Territory.
Table 4. ILC land acquisitions by State/Territory, to 31 July 1998
State/Territory
NSW
NT
Qld
SA
Tas
Vic
WA
Total
Area
(hectares)
53,310
87,100
147,992
714,709
48,960
844
480,458
1,533,374
Total properties
settled
11
2
14
6
2
8
7
50
Total property
costs by region
($ million)
11,464,723
1,554,250
14,098,000
3,793,234
897,500
3,173,500
4,924,100
39,905,307
Average cost
per hectare
($)
215
18
95
6
18
3,760
10
26
Notes: The majority of these properties were acquired and settled in the 1997-98 financial year. No
properties were acquired during 1994-95 or 1995-96. Fifteen properties were settled in 19996-
97. Property costs are essentially based on improved value and do not include related
expenses to the ILC of legal fees, consultancy reports etc.
Source: ILC (August 1998).
The first year the ILC had sole program funding responsibility for
management of indigenous-held land was 1997-98. Although the ILC was
empowered to provide land management assistance to indigenous landholders
prior to 1 July 1997, the ILC and ATSIC agreed that ATSIC should continue to
take responsibility for land management through its Land Acquisition and
Management Program during the two-year period (1995-97) when both
organisations received an allocation from the Land Fund. Significantly, the ILC
has inherited responsibility not only to assist with the land management activities
on the land it has acquired, but also for all indigenous land Australia-wide,
whether the land was purchased or granted through legislation.
Cash management and investment
The operational activities of the ILC do not include the administration of the Land
Fund, nor does it possess powers to direct the activities of the Land Fund. The
investments of the Land Fund, which is a reserve fund within the Commonwealth
Public Account, are administered by ATSIC under delegation from the Minister for
Finance (ILC 1997: 75). Investment policy is monitored through a ministerially-
appointed Consultative Forum which meets twice a year and is comprised of ILC
directors, ATSIC representatives and other such persons the Minister considers
appropriate.
As noted, a key requirement of the legislation is that the Land Fund
becomes self-sustaining. The aim is that the Land Fund will hold $1,106 million
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(in 1994-95 terms) by June 2004 when government appropriations to the fund
cease. This will be achieved by investing approximately66 per cent of the annual
government allocations to the fund over the ten-year period and assuming a
growth of 4 per cent to accumulated reserves. After the first payment to the Land
Fund of $200 million10 in 1994-95, $121 million (indexed) will be appropriated to
the fund by the Commonwealth Government from the 1995-96 to 2003-2004
financial years (ILC 1997: 75) from which $45 million per annum (indexed) is
allocated to the ILC. The remaining $76 million per annum is invested.
Government allocations are inflation-linked and the legislation provides fortop-up
funding should the fund not achieve its anticipated rate of return.
Table 5 outlines the resources earmarked for the purchase of land, land
management, and investment and demonstrates how the objective of self-
sustainability is to be achieved.
Table 5. Projected financial operations of the Land Fund (based on
1994/95 figures)
Year ended 30
June
1995d
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Total
Incomea
($million)
200
121
121
121
121
121
121
121
121
121
1,289
Drawdown from the
Land Fund
($ million)
25
45
45
45
45
45
45
45
45
45
430
Investment'3
($ million)
175
76
76
76
76
76
76
76
76
76
859
Accumulated
reserves0
($ million)
183
270
360
455
553
655
761
872
986
1,106
Notes: a Note that in 1995 and 1996, new money is only $100 million per annum as $21 million
earmarked for land purchases by ATSIC was offset from this appropriation.
b. That statute requires that savings rate be set at 87.5 per cent in year one and 63 per cent
in years two to ten.
c. Assuming a rate of return on accumulated reserves of 4 per cent, $1,106 million will
generate a self-sustaining $44 million from 2005 for operation of the ILC. The total
amount of new money appropriated ($1,289 million in 1994 dollars) is only slightly above
accumulated reserves at year ten.
d. Although the ILC did not become fully operational until 1 June 1995, funds were
expended during the initial implementation stages during 1994-95. However these were
operational expenses and no land was acquired.
During the initial period of administration of the fund by ATSIC, concerns
were raised as to the ability of the Land Fund to reach the indexed target of
$1,106 million by June 2004 due to the restrictive nature of investments
permitted under the Audit Act.11 These concerns were substantially supported by
a consultant engaged by ATSIC to analyse the potential of investmentwithin these
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constraints. However, the Department of Finance and Administration argued that
the restrictive nature of investments under the Audit Act had been significantly
overstated and, unless the existing top-up provision were to be removed, offered
little support for wider investment powers (ILC 1997: 77).
The legislative constraints of the financial regime in which the Land Fund
operates has not prevented the Fund from out-performing the expected 4 per cent
growth target to date. Table 6 indicates the financial performance of the Land
Fund from the 1995-96 financial year to 30 June 1998.
Table 6. Financial performance of the National Land Fund 1995-96 to
1997-98
Year ended 30 June
1996
1997
1998
Anticipated
accumulated reserve
($ million)
270
360
455
Investment
return
(per cent)
4.83
5.32
7.05
Actual accumulated
reserve
($ million)
288
396
527
Note: Investment returns are adjusted to take inflation into account based on inflation indicators
from the Department of Finance and Administration. Real returns are 8.38 per cent for the
year ending 30 June 1995: 7.86 per cent for 1996: 7.84 per cent for 1997: and 10.26 per cent
for 1998.
Source: ILC 1997: 79; 1998a: 102.
What is apparent is that the real return on investments was in excess of the
return required to ensure the capital base of the Land Fund achieves the target of
$1,106 million in 2004. Hence, the required real return to reach the target had
dropped to 3.9 per cent by 30 June 1997 and more recently to 3.7 per cent as at
30 June 1998. The fund is therefore currently in a position to grow beyond the
target or at least to buffer any declines in returns from investment over the next
six years. However, as the legislation currently stands, the ILC could receive all
real returns from investments from July 2004 onwards. This raises concerns of
the viability of the target amount growing after 2004, as there is no statutory
mechanism to ensure accumulated returns are re-invested. The fund could
potentially stagnate or, in real terms, actually decline. ATSIC and the ILC are
aware of this situation and are examining measures to remedy it. One possible
solution, other than amendments to the legislation, would be an agreement that
the ILC continue to drawdown only the equivalent of the $45 million it currently
receives, thus ensuring the potential growth of the fund.
The ILC also apply cash management and investment strategies to a
proportion of its annual drawdown together with its carried forward reserves from
previous financial years. A key operational aim of the ILC is to balance the need
for efficient and effective administration with low administrative overheads so as
to maximise the amount of funding availability for its land acquisition and
management programs (ILC 1997: 29). Accordingly, returns from investments are
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used to meet administrative and operational costs. During the 1997-98 financial
year the ILC was able to offset its operational expenditure of $4.1 million with
income from investments of $5.1 million (ILC 1998a: 78).
Future Directions and Challenges
As the first NILS gives priority to the acquisition of land for cultural purposes as a
means to address dispossession it raises a number of policy issues for the ILC.
The application of such a criterion is problematic due to the variable factors
associated with indigenous dispossession across Australia and, arguably, the
criterion can be applied widely to include all indigenous people who are not
landowners. This raises complex policy dilemmas for the ILC in terms of the
allocation of its resources. Such dilemmas are accentuated in the context that the
scope of land tenures available for native title claim were substantially reduced
after the 1998 amendments to the NTA. This, together with proposed
amendments to the Commonwealth's heritage legislation, could cause indigenous
groups to increasingly seek the assistance of the ILC to acquire culturally-
significant land.
Exactly who should benefit, and the type of benefits the Land Fund would
provide, were salient issues in the course of the parliamentary debates during the
passage of the original Bills, and many of the contentious issues have remained.
More recently the government proposed an amendment to the legislation which
specified a requirement for consideration of 'most disadvantaged/dispossessed'
status in ILC decision-making. This would require the ILCto accord priority to the
'most dispossessed' and 'most disadvantaged' in making grants for the acquisition
of land (ILC 1996a: 31). The ILC strongly objected to the proposal arguing that
'disadvantage in access to land' probably equates roughly with 'dispossession'. A
revised Bill has since included a proposal that the ILC have regard to, or take into
account, the needs of those suffering most disadvantage in access to land rather
than accord priority to those suffering disadvantage.
The narrowing of the criteria applied by the ILC through legislation would
appear to be unnecessary in the context that the NILS already specifies a
requirement that the ILC will take into account the prospects of land being
available to indigenous people through land rights and other land acquisition
laws. However, such laws are not always easily accessible to all indigenous
people. Certainly land rights legislation operating in New South Wales and the
Northern Territory has assisted many Aboriginal people to gain title to land. As we
have noted there are high levels of indigenous land ownership in New South
Wales (by parcels of land) and the Northern Territory (by area). Nevertheless, there
remain many indigenous people in both regions who have been unable to gain
access to land either through land rights statute or by purchase.
The proposed government amendment also seeks to require the ILC to
actively take a role in improving Aboriginal socioeconomic wellbeing through its
land acquisition program. On the one hand, the ILC would assume a role in which
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there are already many active players such as ATSIC. On the other hand, a
correlation between land ownership and improved socioeconomic wellbeing is yet
to be clearly demonstrated. Analysis of market acquisitions undertaken by
ATSIC's Office of Evaluation and Audit in the early 1990s, showed there was an
inverse relationship between rural land ownership and standard measures of
socioeconomic wellbeing (ATSIC 1992: 3). Similarly, social indicators derived from
the five-yearly census indicate that there has been little change in the overall
formal economic status of Aboriginal people in the Northern Territory due to the
granting of land under the ALRA (Altaian 1996: 10). In other words, there would
appear to be no clear positive correlation between the amount of land purchased
or granted under legislation and the socioeconomic status or wellbeing of
indigenous people (ATSIC 1992: 24).
An alternative interpretation is that land has been acquired in areas of
greatest relative need, and because of population movements to these properties,
improvements to socio-economic standards and opportunities have lagged behind
those elsewhere (ATSIC 1992: 3). Of course normative criteria do not always
accurately reflect economic, not to mention cultural, social and political benefits
to indigenous people from land ownership. Land might be used for unorthodox
commercial activities, like wildlife harvesting, or non-market activities, like
hunting and gathering (see Bomford and Caughley 1996). Such activities improve
people's standards of living, but are not measured by official statistics.
Furthermore, because of the historical legacy associated with dispossession,
exclusion from the mainstream provisions of the Australian state, and other
consequences of past government policy and practice, improvements in
socioeconomic standards may take decades to rectify (Altman 1996: 10).
The ILC's current focus is primarily on restoring and enhancing an
indigenous land base and therefore possible land use, in the post-acquisition
period, is of only secondary importance in decisions about acquisitions. However,
the major challenge for the ILC, and the criteria upon which many may ultimately
judge it, lies not in the amount of land it acquires, but in its approach to land
management. A large proportion of the indigenous estate lies within the
geographic area referred to as 'the rangelands' (nearly 75 per cent of the
Australian continent), most of which is 'unimproved' marginal land under pastoral
leasehold tenure (ILC 1998a: 30). Past management practices in the rangelands
have led to environmental degradation of significant areas and call into question
the long-term sustainability of current land uses (ILC 1998a: 30). Potentially, a
major portion of ILC resources may be needed to address this land degradation
legacy or to establish alternative land use strategies.
The indigenous estate now comprises about 15 per cent of the Australian
land mass and presents further policy dilemmas in respect to ILC resources. The
first step, and one which the ILC is currently addressing, is to accurately identify
the extent of the indigenous estate and the range of its land management issues
and needs. The area of land under Aboriginal ownership will expand as land is
gained through native title processes and ILC acquisitions. There are also some
1,200 unresolved land claims in New South Wales, 11 per cent of the Northern
C E N T R E F O R A B O R I G I N A L E C O N O M I C P O L I C Y R E S E A R C H
18 ALTMAN AND POLLACK
Territory remains under claim, and areas of Queensland may also be granted to
indigenous interests through that State's land rights legislation. Given the ILC's
current resources ($45 million indexed) and the estimated current indigenous
land holdings (about 1.1 million sq. kms) the current available resources for land
management equate to less than $40 per square kilometre. This does not factor in
the land acquisition function nor administrative expenditure of the ILC. What is
apparent is that unsubstantiated claims that the ILC is 'so flush with funds it
could buy whole regions' (David Barnett, Australian Financial Review, 2 April
1998, p. 19) fail to understand the complexity of the tasks faced by the ILC,
particularly its land management functions and responsibilities that extend well
beyond land acquisition.
The ILC cannot conceivably undertake the task of land management of the
indigenous estate on its own, although it will be the key coordinating agency.
Other indigenous agencies such as ATSIC, land councils, NTRBs and the ABR in
the Northern Territory will also be key players in indigenous land management
and development. Yet this should not diminish the responsibility of other
Commonwealth agencies and State/Territory governments from their land
management responsibilities within their respective jurisdictions. These agencies
and governments have strategic interests and responsibilities in matters such as
the development of agricultural and primary industries, environmental
management and socioeconomic wellbeing to mention a few. In essence, the
management of the indigenous estate is a collective responsibility. The quest for a
comprehensive coordinated strategy for management of the indigenous estate may
in future years become the pre-eminent goal for the ILC.
While the management of the indigenous estate is wide-ranging, complex
and potentially resource intense, it also presents significant opportunities for a
range of socioeconomic developments. Many indigenous people have aspirations
for land for commercial, tourism, pastoralism, wildlife harvesting and other
agricultural business development. A future goal for the ILC, and one it
acknowledges, lies in its ability to assist to establish frameworks and strategies to
enhance socioeconomic opportunities for indigenous landowners. One recent
initiative of the ILC Board is the incorporation of a commercial subsidiary, Land
Enterprise Australia, which will handle all commercial land management projects.
Land Enterprise Australia will facilitate the negotiation of joint ventures on
indigenous land, particularly in pastoral and agricultural businesses and permit a
more clearly defined commercial focus than is presently possible for the ILC.
Furthermore, by isolating its commercial risk, ILC assets are protected. The
establishment of such an organisation could potentially provide a valuable
'mentoring' service for indigenous land based enterprises. A nationally focused
service of this type is overdue in indigenous land management.
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Conclusion: A new approach?
Land acquisition has figured prominently among the measures designed to
promote policies of self-determination and self-management for indigenous
Australians. But history demonstrates that this role has rarely been clearly
defined. Our brief historic examination of the policies and practices of
Commonwealth institutions charged with responsibility for the acquisition of
land, and its management, for indigenous people suggests that there have been
significant policy shifts and re-emphases over time, sometimes due to the
application of government indigenous policy based on party-political ideology, and
sometimes to rectify policy mistakes and to re-jig program objectives to seek
better outcomes. There has been continual shifting between cultural, social and
economic objectives; some approaches have focused purely on rural and remote
acquisitions, while others have allowed urban land purchase.
The type of institutions undertaking these functions have varied
considerably. A department of state (DAA), statutory authorities with limited
program objectives (ALFC), and others with wide program responsibilities (ADC
and ATSIC) have all tried at various times to get the formula right. Their legacy,
together with many other unresolved issues, present major challenges for the ILC.
Vast areas of land have been acquired by other institutions which are now the
management legacy of the ILC. Much of this land is marginal, having been
overgrazed and degraded, and will now require significant financial commitment
to restore. Concurrently, there are continuing pressures on the ILC to purchase
land, especially given the frustration associated with unmet native title
aspirations since 1993 and the likelihood that these will be exacerbated by the
passage of the Native Title Amendment Act 1998.
It is apparent that policy tensions exist within the ILC's current strategic
objective of acquiring land for cultural purposes. In some respects this priority
relegates other indigenous aspirations for land, most notably for economic
development. While the ILC's policy is based on the sound objective of restoring a
land base to traditional ownership that aims to avoid conflicts over ownership and
to prevent further dispossession, arguably, in strictly enforcing its cultural
criteria, commercially viable land which may facilitate important long-term
economic development for indigenous groups can easily be neglected. On the
other hand, marginal land, because of its cultural significance and ready
availability might be purchased. The challenge for the ILC is how to balance
cultural and commercial aspirations. The establishment of Land Enterprise
Australia, with a strict commercial focus will enhance the ILC's prospects of
achieving better economic outcomes on indigenous-owned land.
Similarly, the ILC has the power to establish additional subsidiaries with
land management functions at the regional level. This option could add a powerful
potential for new policy approaches to indigenous land issues. In particular, the
tensions between cultural and economic developmentobjectives can be addressed
in ways that have not been possible before. For example, a land management
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subsidiary could sub-lease land from traditional owners for commercial
operations. There is a view that commercial success requires large tracts of land
to allow economies of scale: sub-leasing on a large regional basis could provide
indigenous interests with such opportunities.
It is far too early to definitely assess whether the ILC has been successful,
given that its operations of land acquisition and management have only began in
the last two years. Investment performance of the Land Fund indicates that the
goal of financial self-sufficiency will be achieved, thus providing financial
resources independent of the budget well into the next century. The ILC is also
making considerable progress towards quantifying indigenous land holdings
throughout Australia. The completion of this task will be important as it will
provide an essential and rigorous base for further policy refinement and
development. Overall, it is evident that the ILC is undertaking the preliminary
research, data collection and analysis necessary to comprehend the complex
environment in which it operates. This strategic and proactive, yet cautious,
approach augurs well for improved outcomes in indigenous land acquisition and
management that should easily exceed earlier efforts over the past 25 years.
The subtitle of this discussion paper asks whether the ILC represents a new
approach to land acquisition and land management. This question can be
answered in the affirmative on a number of grounds. First, the statutorily
guaranteed income stream for a Commonwealth statutory authority is
unprecedented in indigenous land acquisition and management. Second, the
above-mentioned commercial powers and powers to establish subsidiaries is a
significant break with the past. And finally, the ILChas autonomy and flexibility
in dividing income between administration, land purchase, land management and
investment. This, though, is a new strength as well as potential weakness: a key
challenge for the ILC Board will be to ensure that administrative costs are
contained and that expenditure to running cost ratios are continually
benchmarked to ensure mean and lean practice.
In the long term, after 2004, the ILC will become an off-budget indigenous
institution with enormous potential to further indigenous economic development
and reconciliation: it is in this long term and strategic sense that the ILC
approach is most fundamentallynew.
Notes
1. Much of the literature published about the Land Fund and ILC refer to an amount of
$1.46 billion in government appropriations over the ten years. This is an estimate of
total government allocations to the Land Fund which are indexedannually.
2. It is estimated that the commitment of $5 million in 1972 equates to $30.5 million in
1997 dollars, and $2 million (1972) equates to $12.2 million (1997).
3. Palmer's (1988) study of the ALFC concludes that its history was one of struggle
against a variety of measures each of which diminished the ability of the ALFC to meet
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the Aboriginal desire for land. These measures included government cuts to the ALFC
budget, and DAAstrategies of avoiding, pre-empting, re-orienting, blocking and re-
checking ALFC proposals. In Queensland and Western Australia title transfers to
Aboriginal communties were either delayed on technical grounds or refused outright.
4. The ABR was formerly the Aboriginals Benefit Trust Account (ABTA). It was renamed
as of 1 January 1998with the enactment of the Commonwealth's Financial
Management and Accountability Act 1997and consequential amendment to the
Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976.
5. The balance of the funds in the RLF at 1 July 1997stood at $8.9 million. An
additional $942,527 was deposited in the RLFand interest of $435,449 was credited
during the 1997-98 financial year (ATS1C 1998: 42).
6. There are other complications in determining the outcome of land acquisition
programs. Pastoral leases acquired in the Northern Territory by a range of institutions
have been claimed under the ALRA. Title gained through market land acquisition has,
in practice, been later transferred to an Aboriginal Land Trust as s.50 of the
legislation permits claims on alienated land provided the land is held by, or on behalf
of, Aboriginals. Essentially all land acquired in the Northern Territory by the ABR,
ATSIC and its predecessors, has been claimed under the ALRA. As a consequence,
analysis of statistical data to gauge the area gained by indigenous interests and its
outcomes fall into categories of both land acquisition and grants of land through land
rights statute.
7. Although published in 1996, the compilation of these statistics relied heavily on
information from AUSLIG dated 1993and are believed to be understated and did not
include land parcels of less than 5.000 hectares. It is known, for example, that the
parcels of land held by indigenous interests in Tasmania are at least double those
cited. ATSIC's land acquisition database records 19 properties acquired between1972
and 1997. Pursuant to Tasmania's .Aboriginal Lands Act 1995, 12 parcels of land were
vested to the Tasmanian Aboriginal Land Council following the enactment of that
legislation. The parcels of land in New South Wales may also be significantly
understated. Since the enactment of the New South Wales Aboriginal Land Rights Act
some 1,535land claims have been granted. ATSIC's database records 66 land
acquisitions in NSW and Altman (1994: 70) notes that the New South Wales
Aboriginal Land Council had acquired 117 properties through its own program funds.
8. The Australian Capital Territory is included in the New South Wales Regional
Indigenous Land Strategy.
9. Notably, land acquired by the ILC in the Northern Territory cannot be claimed under
the ALRA due to specific provisions of the enabling legislation. In reality the clause
was never applied as no purchases were made in the Northern Territory prior to the
effect of the 'sunset' clause on 5 June 1997 which prevented any further claims being
lodged with the Aboriginal Land Commissioner.
10. $200 million was allocated to the Land Fund in 1994-95 as an interim measure under
clause 201 of the NTA. As the specific legislative arrangements of the Land Fund had
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not been established, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet was given
responsibility for investing the allocation under interim arrangements (ILC 1997: 74).
11. The Audit Act 1901 has since been replaced by the Financta! Management and
Accountability Act 1997 yet essentially the same provisions and constraints of
investment apply.
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